China’s Vision of Victory / Çin'i Anlamak Madencilikte Başarı İçin Bir Ön Koşuldur
Amanda van Dyke
12 Şubat 2026
Birkaç yıl önce, Denver Altın Forumu'nda, Connecticut
merkezli bir fon yöneticisiyle sohbet ediyordum. Çin'in altın pozisyonu ve
Pekin'in kendisini farklı bir uluslararası para düzenine nasıl konumlandırdığı
sorusu hakkında konuşuyorduk. Bir noktada, neredeyse laf arasında,
Washington'ın Çin'e bakış açısının evrimini gerçekten anlamak istiyorsam, o
zamanlar politika çevrelerinde dolaşan bir kitabı okumam gerektiğini söyledi:
Jonathan D. T. Ward'ın "Çin'in Zafer Vizyonu".
Tavsiyesini dinledim. Ve kitap, Çin ile ilgili her şeye
bakış açımı etkiledi. O zamandan beri, Çin'in büyük stratejisi ve deniz
gücünden tedarik zincirlerine, yaptırımlara ve küresel ekonominin "komuta
zirveleri" üzerindeki yavaş, yıpratıcı mücadeleye kadar geniş bir
yelpazedeki konular hakkında düşünme biçimimi doğrudan şekillendirdi. Ward,
mineraller hakkında açıkça çok az şey söylüyor, ancak sonuçlarını lityum, nadir
toprak elementleri, grafit, bakır ve daha geniş enerji geçiş araç setine
uyguladığınızda, haritayı görmenin çok farklı ve çok daha az keyfi bir yolunu
elde ediyorsunuz. Bu konular hakkında yazarken arka planda duran temel
metinlerden biri ve okuyucularımın, yaptığım iddiaları dile getirirken nereden
konuştuğumu bilmeyi hak ettiğini düşünüyorum.
Bu durum beni özellikle derinden etkiledi çünkü Çin'i
içeriden anlamaya zaten yatırım yapmıştım. MBA ve uluslararası ekonomi
alanındaki ortak yüksek lisansımın bir parçası olarak, Şanghay'daki Çin Avrupa
Uluslararası İşletme Okulu'nda (CEIBS) bir programa katıldım ve bunun bana Çin
iş kültürüne dair temel bilgiler vereceğini varsaydım. Verdi ve hala veriyor:
Çinli firmaların nasıl müzakere ettiğini, plan yaptığını ve uyguladığını,
ilişkilerin, hiyerarşinin ve uzun vadeli konumlandırmanın kurumsal düzeyde nasıl
işlediğini anlamamı keskinleştirdi. Ancak bu deneyimi Ward'ın argümanıyla bir
araya getirdiğimde tablo gerçekten tamamlandı. Bu kombinasyon, Çin'in stratejik
niyetini ("neden"), Çin devlet-işletme entegrasyonunu
("nasıl") ve Çin'in Batı ile finans, teknoloji ve kaynaklar
alanındaki rekabetinin yapısal yönünü ("nereye gidiyor") anlamama
yardımcı oldu.
Bu nedenle, bu yazıyı ve daha da önemlisi, kitabın kendisini
okumanızı umuyorum. Ward'la aynı fikirde olsanız da olmasanız da, Çin'in ne
istediği, oraya nasıl ulaşmayı planladığı ve bunun, büyük ölçüde Amerikan
gücüyle şekillenen sistemlerde yaşayan ve çalışan bizler için ne anlama geldiği
sorusuyla yüzleşmenizi sağlıyor. Kritik mineraller, sanayi politikası veya
küresel ticaretin yeniden şekillenmesiyle ilgileniyorsanız, onun argümanında
rahatsız edici derecede alakalı birçok şey bulacaksınız.
A number of years ago, at the Denver Gold Forum, I fell into conversation with a Connecticut‑based fund manager. We were talking about China’s gold position, and the broader question of how Beijing was positioning itself for a different kind of international monetary order. At some point he said, almost in passing, that if I really wanted to understand Washington’s evolving view of China, I needed to read a book that was then circulating in policy circles: Jonathan D. T. Ward’s China’s Vision of Victory. I took his advice. And the book has affected the way Iook at anything related to China. It has directly shaped how I think about a wide range of subjects ever since: from Chinese grand strategy and maritime power to supply chains, sanctions, and the slow, grinding contest over the “commanding heights” of the global economy. Ward says very little about minerals explicitly, but once you apply his conclusions to lithium, rare earths, graphite, copper, and the broader energy‑transition toolkit, you get a very different and far less arbitrary way of seeing the map. It is one of the key texts sitting in the background when I write about these issues, and I think my readers deserve to know where I am speaking from when I make the kinds of claims I do. This hit me with particular force because I had already invested in understanding China from the inside. As part of my MBA and joint master’s in international economics, I completed a program at China Europe International Business School (CEIBS) in Shanghai, which I assumed would give me the core insights I needed into Chinese business culture. It did, and still does: it sharpened my sense of how Chinese firms negotiate, plan, and execute, and how relationships, hierarchy, and long‑term positioning operate at the corporate level. But it was only when I put that experience alongside Ward’s argument that the picture really came together. The combination has helped me understand Chinese strategic intent (the “why”), Chinese state–business integration (the “how”), and the structural direction of China’s contest with the West across finance, technology, and resources (the “where this is going”). So I hope you will consider reading this piece and, more importantly, reading the book itself. Whether you agree with Ward or not, he forces you to confront the question of what China wants, how it intends to get there, and what that means for those of us who live and work in systems still largely shaped by American power. If you care about critical minerals, industrial policy, or the reshaping of global trade, you will find plenty in his argument that is uncomfortably relevant. Jonathan D. T. Ward is an American analyst of Chinese grand strategy and U.S.–China competition, and the author of China’s Vision of Victory (2019) and The Decisive Decade: American Grand Strategy for Triumph Over China (2023). He has been studying China, Russia, and India for nearly twenty years, beginning with undergraduate work in Russian and Chinese at Columbia University and continuing through a doctorate at the University of Oxford, where he specialised in China–India relations and drew heavily on Chinese‑language sources. Ward is the founder and president of Atlas Organization, a Washington, DC‑based consultancy that advises Fortune 500 companies, financial institutions, and U.S. government bodies on U.S.–China global competition and the strategic risks of doing business with or around China. Through Atlas, he helps boards and executives rethink global footprints, supply chains, and market strategies in light of Beijing’s long‑term objectives and the likelihood of sustained geopolitical friction. The Core thesis Ward argues that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has a long‑term, openly articulated project: to achieve the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” by 2049, which in practice means replacing the United States as the leading global power and reshaping the international order around Chinese primacy. He insists this is not a hidden conspiracy but a vision repeatedly laid out in official speeches, party documents, and strategic plans. The book’s purpose is to expose that vision in a way Western policymakers and business elites can’t ignore. Structure and main parts The book is organised into five broad parts, each corresponding to a key dimension of China’s rise: national narrative, military‑strategic geography, economic power, global influence operations, and a future world order with China at its centre. Throughout, Ward weaves in both elite sources (leaders’ speeches, policy papers) and anecdotal conversations from his time living and travelling in China, which he uses to show how these ambitions resonate in everyday nationalism. Part 1) National rejuvenation and ideology Ward places the idea of “rejuvenation” at the centre of CCP strategy since 1949, arguing that every leadership generation has contributed to a continuous project rather than periodic policy swings. Mao framed this as revolutionary liberation, Deng and Jiang as economic modernisation under the injunction to “hide your brightness, bide your time”, and Hu Jintao as exploiting a “period of strategic opportunity” for growth. Under Xi, the “China Dream” becomes explicitly global: national rejuvenation is not complete unless China regains a leading position “among the nations of the world”, with Asia and then the wider system reordered in its favour. One recurring motif Ward highlights is the shift in official rhetoric from “peaceful rise” to language about “fighting the bloody battle against our enemies” and “preparing to fight and win wars”, which he interprets as a move from reassurance to open preparation for great‑power confrontation. He argues that Chinese leaders see their current project as continuous with a much older Sinocentric order, in which surrounding polities were hierarchically arranged as tributaries rather than equals. Part 2) Strategic geography and military build‑up Ward’s second major theme is the way Beijing maps its strategic environment: not only continental frontiers but maritime zones, outer space, cyberspace, and key resource and transport corridors worldwide. He describes the notion of “blue national soil” as a way Chinese strategists talk about seas, sea lanes, and distant waters that must be controlled or contested as extensions of national territory. This is linked to rapid naval modernisation, anti‑access/area‑denial capabilities, and investments in emerging technologies that could offset U.S. advantages. Ward contends that the PLA’s goal is to be able to outclass U.S. forces first in the Western Pacific and then across the globe, enabling China to coerce neighbours, fracture U.S. alliance networks, and eventually limit American ability to project power into key regions. He connects this to internal security and border defence doctrines, arguing that domestic control, frontier stability, and external expansion are seen as parts of a single security problem. Part 3) Economic power as the engine For Ward, economic growth and technological upgrading are the foundation of China’s “comprehensive national power”, the composite measure Chinese strategists use to evaluate their position against other states. He emphasises that Beijing has used a long‑term, multi‑front strategy: integrating into global markets, nurturing national champions, directing outbound investment, and using students, entrepreneurs, and state‑linked firms to acquire foreign technology and intellectual property. Ward argues that initiatives like the Belt and Road are central to this strategy, not add‑ons: by financing infrastructure across Eurasia, Africa, and parts of Europe, China aims to re‑orient trade routes and political loyalties towards Beijing and away from the U.S.‑centred system. The economic programme is thus both developmental and geopolitical, seeking to bind states into relationships of dependence and deference that echo older tributary patterns. Part 4) Global influence and world order Beyond hard power and economics, the book details China’s attempts to shape international norms and institutions. Ward describes how Beijing promotes concepts like a “community of common destiny for mankind”, which he interprets as a euphemism for a hierarchical order where China sits at the apex and other states accept varying degrees of subordination. He uses Chinese writings that distinguish between “interior” and “exterior” vassals to illustrate how some states would be tightly integrated and others loosely aligned, but almost none would relate to China as peers. He argues that this vision entails eroding U.S. alliance systems in Europe and Asia, undermining “zero‑sum” security arrangements in favour of looser, China‑centric frameworks, and rewriting rules in areas from trade to human rights to better accommodate authoritarian governance. To make this concrete, Ward ends with a “day in the life” style vignette of a future world dominated by Chinese power, meant to show how such a system could feel normalised to those living within it. Part 5) Policy prescriptions and critiques In the final sections, Ward calls for a fundamental reorientation of U.S. and allied strategy. He advocates what critics describe as a robust containment approach: strengthening military capabilities, re‑anchoring alliances, reducing economic dependence on China, and “closing off” the channels, technological, financial, educational, through which Beijing accelerates its rise. He frames this as a defensive response to CCP ambitions rather than an attempt to halt China’s development per se. Reviewers sympathetic to his argument praise the book’s heavy use of primary Chinese sources and its accessible synthesis of what can otherwise seem like scattered policy documents. It is relevant to note that post the publication of this book the CCP cut off public access to CCP archives. More critical readers note that Ward sometimes mixes rigorous textual analysis with less systematic anecdotes, and raise questions about fairness and feasibility, particularly the tension between defending a liberal order and embracing hard‑line containment measures that might resemble the very practices being opposed. My time in China , and especially watching the country assemble what is arguably the most ambitious minerals ecosystem ever built, has left me with a deep respect for the Chinese system and the people. From the shop floor to the C‑suite, what struck me again and again was how profoundly pragmatic idealistic they are. In contrast to the caricatures that dominate much Western commentary, most of the Chinese people I have dealt with are among the most business‑oriented, market‑sensitive, and frankly capitalist individuals I have ever met. Their work ethic, their willingness to grind through adversity, their comfort with risk, and their instinct for long‑term positioning all reflect a culture that takes commerce and national advancement with absolute seriousness. At the same time, that pragmatism sits alongside an intense nationalism. Many of the people I met did not necessarily “love” the controls and intrusions that come with the CCP’s rule, which can be harsh and very much “Chinese style” when it is applied. But they largely accept the bargain. They are bought into a social contract in which personal freedoms are constrained, information is managed, and political space is tightly controlled, in exchange for stability, rising living standards, and the prospect of China’s emergence as the world’s leading power. There is a widespread recognition that, for all its flaws, the Party and Xi Jinping in particular is the vehicle most likely to deliver that outcome. One needs to respect that China has taken 1.3 billion people out of extreme poverty and into the ranks of the global middle classes, they have provided opportunity and an excellent quality of life for their people. They are dependent on no one, their industry, technology, and military are world class. They are the second largest economy on the planet and might very well become the largest in the near future. No civilization has developed this much this fast in the history of humanity. We might not like their methods but you cannot argue with their results. What this produces is a formidable combination: a people who are entrepreneurial and commercially minded to their core, yet willing, when necessary, to subordinate individual aspirations to what they see as the larger project of national rejuvenation and a government that is razor focussed on global hegemony on behalf of those people. That alignment between personal ambition, corporate ambition, and national ambition is something we in the West have not really grappled with. For years, we have oscillated between complacency and caricature, comforting ourselves with the idea that China would either liberalise politically or stagnate economically, while largely ignoring the coherence of its long‑term project. We do ourselves no favours by reducing China to an enemy to be contained or a market to be exploited. A more serious approach starts with studying them carefully: how they think about power, how they think about business, how they organise production, how they use the state to shape markets, and how ordinary people understand their role in this larger story. It requires working with them where interests align, competing hard where they do not, and understanding that neither side is going away. We are almost certainly moving into a bipolar world order in which the Chinese system and the Western system coexist, collide, and coevolve for decades to come. In that world, ignorance is not a strategy. Admiration does not preclude realism, and realism does not require dehumanising the other side. |
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